

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

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USIA-15 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04 AEC-11

OMB-01 SAM-01 DRC-01 /162 W
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FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2443

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 VIENNA 3245

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR: ATTITUDE OF WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS TOWARDS
MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

REF: VIENNA 9953 DATED DECEMBER 3, 1974

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: IN THE SECOND SESSION OF THE MBFR
TALKS IN VIENNA, THE RESERVE WITH WHICH WESTERN EUROPEAN
DIRECT PARTICIPANTS HAVE VIEWED THE POSSIBILITY OF
THEIR UNDERTAKING COMMITMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE
MBFR NEGOTIATIONS HAS BECOME SOMEWHAT MORE PRONOUNCED.
IN PARTICULAR, FRG REP, WHO PLAYS KEY ROLE, HAS
BECOME INCREASINGLY CAUTIOUS ABOUT GERMAN PARTICIPA-
TION. IN ADDITION, WESTERN EUROPEAN REPRESENTATIVES
HAVE IDENTIFIED SOME SPECIFIC NEW PROBLEMS WITH REGARD

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TO THEIR POSSIBLE PARTICIPATION IN REDUCTIONS. END SUMMARY.

2. SINCE THE MBFR TALKS RESUMED IN JANUARY, WESTERN EUROPEAN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS HAVE BECOME PERCEPTABLY MORE RESERVED WITH REGARD TO PARTICIPATION IN THE REDUCTION PROCESS OR UNDERTAKING OBLIGATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH IT. OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, ONLY THE NETHERLANDS REP HAS REGULARLY INDICATED A POSITIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE NEGOTIATIONS AND TAKEN POSITIONS ACCORDINGLY IN THE WORK OF THE AD HOC GROUP. DESPITE CHANGE IN THE UK GOVERNMENT, THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE AS YET IN THE UK POSITION, WHICH CONTINUES CONSERVATIVE AND RESTRICTED. THE BELGIAN REP HAS TOLD US THAT HE BELIEVES THE RIGHT POSITION FOR BELGIUM IS NOT TO BLOCK A FIRST PHASE US-SOVIET AGREEMENT, BUT TO DRAW OUT SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS AS REGARDS EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION IN REDUCTIONS SO THAT THEY HAVE NO REAL OUTCOME.

3. THE FRG REP BEHRENDT HAS PROGRESSIVELY SHOWN MORE AND MORE CAUTION WITH REGARD TO MORE AND MORE ASPECTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE SEEMS NO LONGER WILLING TO HINT TO THE EAST EVEN ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS THAT THE FRG WOULD PARTICIPATE IN A SECOND PHASE. THE INTELLECTUALLY GIFTED AND ENERGETIC ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE CONTINUES TO PROPAGATE HIS VIEW THAT THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS ARE A MISTAKEN IDEA AND THAT, IF WORSE COME TO WORSE, IT WOULD BE BETTER TO HAVE UNILATERAL US WITHDRAWALS, WHICH HE BELIEVES WOULD SHOCK THE EUROPEANS INTO INCREASED DEFENSE EFFORT AND COOPERATION, AND WOULD AT LEAST AVOID LONG-TERM WESTERN EUROPEAN COMMITMENTS VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIETS IN THE DEFENSE FIELD. OF THE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, CANADA AND LUXEMBOURG HAVE PLAYED NO ROLE ONE WAY OR THE OTHER.

4. THIS GROWING COOLNESS ON THE PART OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS HAS ALSO BEEN SHOWN IN THE EMERGENCE OF SPECIFIC NEW CONCERNS ABOUT THEIR POSSIBLE PARTICIPATION. WESTERN EUROPEAN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS HAVE DEVELOPED THEIR RELUCTANCE TO AVOID
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INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL CEILINGS AMONG THE EUROPEAN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS INTO AN INSISTANCE THAT, IF THERE IS A COMMON CEILING, IT MUST BE AN OVERALL ONE FOR EACH SIDE. IN THEIR VIEW, WESTERN EUROPEAN FORCES SHOULD NOT FORM A SEPARATE EUROPEAN CONTINGENT OR QUOTA. THEY BELIEVE WESTERN EUROPEAN FORCES SHOULD IN FUTURE HAVE NOT ONLY THE POSSIBILITY TO INCREASE TO COMPENSATE FOR POTENTIAL FUTURE DECREASES AMONG THEIR OWN RANKS

BUT ALSO THE RIGHT TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES TO MAKE UP FOR ANY FUTURE US REDUCTIONS ABOVE AND BEYOND THOSE AGREED IN THE PLANNED CYCLE OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, AND ALSO TO PERMIT IMPLEMENTATION OF POSSIBLE FUTURE EUROPEAN AGREEMENTS COVERING SPECIALIZATION BY INDIVIDUAL WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IN ONE OR THE OTHER TYPES OF FORCES.

5. IN THE CONTEXT OF THEIR CONTINUED VIGILANT OPPOSITION TO NATIONAL CEILINGS, UK AND FRG REPS HAVE BEEN EXPRESSING CONCERN IN INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH US THAT A COMMITMENT IN A PHASE I AGREEMENT BY DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO REDUCE TO REACH A COMMON CEILING IN A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT HAVE SOME EFFECT TOWARD ESTABLISHING NATIONAL SUB-CEILINGS AND THUS MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR INDIVIDUAL WEST EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES IN THE FUTURE. IN THIS SENSE, UK AND FRG REPS ARGUE THAT A COMMITMENT ON THE PART OF INDIVIDUAL WESTERN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES IN A SECOND PHASE IN ORDER TO REACH A COMMON CEILING WOULD ESTABLISH A LEGAL COMMITMENT NOT TO INCREASE THEIR INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL FORCES AFTER INITIAL REDUCTIONS HAD BEEN MADE. WE HAVE POINTED OUT TO UK AND FRG REPS THAT IF SUCH A COMMITMENT WERE UNDERTAKEN, IT WOULD VERY LIKELY BE IN THE FORM OF AN OBLIGATION TO REDUCE FORCES TO REACH A COMMON CEILING AND THAT, IF THE ALLIES ARE SUCCESSFUL IN ACHIEVING EASTERN AGREEMENT TO AN OVERALL CEILING FOR EACH SIDE, THE ONLY CONTINUING OBLIGATION INDIVIDUAL ALLIES WOULD HAVE FOLLOWING ON INITIAL REDUCTIONS TO REACH THE AGREED CEILING WOULD BE THAT THEY SHOULD NOT COLLECTIVELY EXCEED THAT CEILING.

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FROM US REP MBFR

6. UK AND FRG REPS HAVE THEN ARGUED THAT NONETHELESS, BY TAKING ON AN OBLIGATION TO REDUCE IN PHASE II IN A PHASE I AGREEMENT, THEY WOULD BE EXPOSING THEMSELVES TO BOTH SOVIET AND DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRESSURES NOT TO INCREASE THE LEVEL OF THEIR INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL FORCES ONCE EACH OF THEM REDUCED. THESE REPRESENTATIVES ARGUE THAT TAKING

ON SUCH A COMMITMENT IN A PHASE I AGREEMENT MIGHT THEREFORE MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL FORCES TO INCREASE SUBSEQUENTLY EITHER IN ORDER TO CARRY OUT AGREED SPECIALIZATION AMONG THE EUROPEAN FORCES, TO COMPENSATE FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE US REDUCTIONS, OR TO COMPENSATE FOR NATIONAL REDUCTIONS BY ONE OF THEIR NUMBERS WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO PREVENT.

7. THESE CONCERNS DO NOT MEAN THAT EITHER FRG OR UK
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REPS WOULD ACTIVELY REJECT IDEA OF PHASE I COMMITMENT BY THEIR GOVERNMENTS TO PARTICIPATE IN PHASE II. IN FACT, BOTH HAVE RECOMMENDED THIS TO THEIR CAPITALS IN DECEMBER. HOWEVER, SINCE THEN, THEY HAVE BOTH BECOME MARKEDLY MORE SENSITIVE TO THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH A STEP.

8. SIMILARLY, THE FRG, UK AND ITALIAN REPS HAVE RAISED THE ISSUE OF WHETHER AGREEMENT ON A COMMON CEILING WOULD

MEAN AN ABSOLUTE LIMIT ON THE FORCES OF THOSE COUNTRIES WHOSE TERRITORY IS TOTALLY WITHIN THE REDUCTIONS AREA-- THE FRG AND BENELUX--AND WOULD THEREFORE MEAN THAT THESE COUNTRIES WOULD BE PREVENTED FROM MAINTAINING ADDITIONAL FORCES IN TERRITORIES OUTSIDE OF THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THE ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE ARGUES THAT THE GERMANS MUST BE ALLOWED THE FREEDOM TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES OUTSIDE THE AREA, THAT THIS MIGHT BE DESIRABLE FOR THE EVENT OF FUTURE WESTERN EUROPEAN COOPERATION WHICH INVOLVED, FOR EXAMPLE, EXCHANGE AGREEMENTS SHIFTING FEDERAL GERMAN UNITS TO THE UK OR FRANCE WHILE SIMILAR UK OR FRENCH UNITS FO TO GERMANY. THE ITALIAN REP HAS ARGUED THAT IT WILL TAKE A LONG TIME BEFORE THERE IS EFFECTIVE EUROPEAN DEFENSE COOPERATION, BUT THAT, BY THAT TIME, THE FRENCH, GIVEN THE FACT OF THEIR POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OF A CERTAIN POLITICAL EVOLUTION, WILL NO LONGER INSIST THAT FRG FORCES ABIDE BY WEU FORCE LIMITATIONS.

9. THE THEORETICAL CASE OF A FEDERAL GERMAN CONTRIBUTION TO UN PEACE-KEEPING FORCE HAS ALSO BEEN CITED. UK, FRG AND ITALIAN REPS FEEL THE GERMANS SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO FILL UP THEIR FORCES WITHIN THE AREA TO MAKE UP FOR ANY SUCH COMMITMENT OF FORCES OUTSIDE OF IT. THEY ARGUE THAT SINCE THE USSR WOULD BE UNDERTAKING ONLY TO MAINTAIN THE LEVEL OF THOSE OF ITS FORCES IN THE AREA AT A CERTAIN CEILING, WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS SHOULD NOT BE OBLIGATED TO UNDERTAKE DIFFERENT, LARGER OR BROADER COMMITMENTS. BELGIAN REP HAS
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SPOKEN OF DESIRE OF BELGIANS TO PERMANENTLY MAINTAIN SOME FORCES IN TRAINING AREAS IN SARDINIA OR CORSICA.

10. FRG AND UK REPS HAVE ALSO EXPRESSED INTEREST IN BEING ABLE TO BE SURE THAT FRG AND OTHER COUNTRIES WITHIN AREA OF REDUCTIONS WOULD NOT BE UNDER ANY LIMITATIONS AS REGARDS THEIR FREEDOM TO TRAIN AND EXERCISE THEIR FORCES OUTSIDE THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

11. ACCORDING TO FRG REP, HE HAS DISCUSSED THIS ENTIRE ISSUE WITH SOVIET REP SMIRNOVSKY, WHO INDICATED SOVIETS WERE AWARE OF PROBLEM AND WOULD WISH TO FIND SOME WAY OF BLOCKING THIS LOOPHOLE FOR UNCONTROLLED GROWTH OF THE BUNDESWEHR IN THE EVENT OF AN AGREEMENT.

12. THESE CONSIDERATIONS HAVE ALSO LED FRG REP TO EXPRESS SOME COOLNESS TOWARDS IDEA OF NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISIONS INVOLVING HUNGARY ON THE GROUNDS THAT THIS MIGHT ELICIT SOVIET COUNTER-REQUEST TO EXTENDING A SIMILAR PROVISION TO FRENCH TERRITORY, WHICH WOULD BLOCK FRG FROM STATIONING FORCES THERE IN THE FUTURE. FRG REP HAS ALSO SHOWN CONSIDERABLE SENSITIVITY TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A NUCLEAR CEILING OR FREEZE ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT COULD EFFECT LONGER TERM EUROPEAN NUCLEAR POTENTIAL WITHIN THE AREA. AS WASHINGTON AGENCIES ARE AWARE, FRG HAS ALSO INDICATED COOLING OF FORMER SUPPORT FOR VERIFICATION BY OBSERVERS AND FOR STABILIZING MEASURES. UK HAS JOINED FRG ON LATTER POINT.

13. WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR IN CONCLUDING THIS BRIEF ASSESSMENT THAT AT NO POINT HAVE WESTERN EUROPEAN MBFR REPS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE ITALIAN, WHO ADMITS HIS POINT IS AN INTELLECTUAL ONE, NOT A PROPOSAL FOR ACTION, SUGGESTED THAT THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS BE DROPPED OR THAT THEIR AUTHORITIES WOULD WISH TO WITHDRAW FROM THEM. NONETHELESS, WE HAVE YET TO HEAR FROM ANY WESTERN EUROPEAN REPRESENTATIVE ANY POSITIVE STATEMENT ABOUT THE POTENTIAL LONG-RANGE CONTRIBUTION OF MBFR AGREEMENTS TO THEIR SECURITY.

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AS FAR AS THEY ARE CONCERNED, THE NEGOTIATION IS AT PRESENT CONSIDERED SOLELY AS AN EFFORT AT DAMAGE LIMITATION, BOTH WITH REGARD TO THE POSSIBILITY OF AMERICAN REDUCTIONS AND TO THEIR OWN PARTICIPATION IN COMMITMENTS VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION. HUMES

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